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RECOVERY FOR NERVOUS INJURY RESULTING FROM MENTAL
STIMULUS UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Commission,
62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976)
"[Wlhen a man in the course of his employment sustains a nervous
shock producing physiological injury, not a mere emotional impulse, he
meets with an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." I
With this statement, the King's Bench, in the case of Yates v. South Kirby
Collieries, Ltd. ,2 allowed a miner, who had suffered a debilitating nervous
injury as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to aid a fatally-injured co-
worker, to receive compensation under the 1906 Workmen's Compensation
Law of England. 3 More importantly, however, the court thus indicated that
in workmen's compensation cases involving mental or nervous injury,
recovery could be obtained even though that injury was incurred solely as a
result of a mental stimulus, i.e., in the absence of physical impact upon the
person of the claimant. Sixty-six years later, the Supreme Court of Illinois
reached the same conclusion in the case of Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial
Commission4 and eliminated the physical impact requirement that had
previously been a prerequisite to recovery for nervous injury under the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. 5
The rise and fall of the physical impact rule in workmen's compensa-
tion cases bears a close resemblance to similar developments in the law of
negligence. Although the prerequisites for recovery under any given work-
men's compensation statute are, in general, vastly different from the ele-
ments necessary to state a prima facie negligence case, 6 courts have tradi-
tionally stated in both areas that there could be no recovery for mental or
nervous injury unless there had been some physical impact, no matter how
slight or insignificant, upon the person of the plaintiff.7 An examination of
I. Yates v. South Kirby Collieries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 538, 541.
2. Id.
3. 6 Edw. 7, c. 58 (1906).
4. 62 II1. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138-138.28 (1975).
6. A plaintiff in a negligence action must plead and prove the existence of a duty owed
him by the defendant, a breach of that duty, causation and damages. W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. The claimant in a workmen's compen-
sation case, however, generally must prove only that he was injured as a result of an "acci-
dent" arising out of and in the course of his employment. The claimant is usually able to
recover regardless of the absence of negligence on the part of the employer and regardless of
any contributory negligence on his own part. 62 I11. 2d at 563, 343 N.E.2d at 916-17.
7. See PROSSER, supra note 6, at § 54; 1. A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION § 42.23 (1973).
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recent workmen's compensation cases in which compensation is sought for
a mental injury caused by an accident in the form of a mental stimulus
clearly reveals that jurisdictions remain in which a claimant will be denied
recovery for his mental or nervous injury unless there has been some
physical impact upon his person. 8 However, most courts have taken the
position of the Illinois Supreme Court in Pathfinder and have dismissed the
physical impact requirement. 9 This is parallel to a trend in the field of
negligence. There the physical impact rule is slowly being eliminated and
damages are being awarded to bystander-plaintiffs who have sustained
mental injury merely upon witnessing the negligent infliction of harm by the
defendant upon a third person.' 0
The purpose of this comment is to analyze Pathfinder's effect upon
future workmen's compensation cases in which recovery is sought for
mental injury arising from a mental stimulus. In this analysis the rationale of
the Illinois Supreme Court will be examined as well as the applicability of
that rationale in those jurisdictions which still adhere to the physical impact
rule in mental injury cases. In addition, this comment will consider the
possible effect of Pathfinder on the physical impact rule vis-a-vis common
law negligence, an area which has unfortunately been confused with work-
men's compensation in the past.
8. As of this writing, the following states are among those that refuse to allow recovery.
under the applicable workmen's compensation statute for mental injury caused solely by a
mental stimulus: Arizona: Ayer v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 Ariz. App. 163, 531 P.2d 208 (1975);
Florida: City Ice & Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952); Georgia: Brady v. Royal Mfg.
Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968); Kansas: Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
196 Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966); Louisiana: Johnson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 196
So. 2d 635 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Nebraska: Bekeleski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657,4 N.W.2d
741 (1942).
9. See cases cited at note 42 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 78-91 infra. Even though physical impact is being
eliminated as a prerequisite to recovery for negligently inflicted injury, most courts continue to
demand that the mental injury be manifested by physical consequences. Krause v. Graham, 57
Cal. App. 3d 752, 129 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1976); Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538,
119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975); PROSSER, supra note 6, at § 54. Contra, Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw.
398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
It is generally held that negligently inflicted mental injury, without more, does not give rise
to a cause of action. See Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952).
But to this general rule is added the caveat that some forms of mental injury have such a
deleterious effect upon the body that they must be treated as forms of physical injury.
"[Diefinite nervous disturbances or disorders caused by mental shock and excitement are
classified as physical injuries and will support an action for damages for negligence . Id. at
234, 249 P.2d at 844 (quoting with approval trial judge's charge to jury).
The traumatic neurosis suffered by the claimant in Pathfinder (see note II infra) is an
example of the "definite nervous disturbance or disorder" that is to be treated as a physical
injury in negligence cases where the court demands physical manifestations of the emotional
disturbance. Whenever the term "mental injury" is used in this comment, it refers to that type
of mental disturbance (specifically, traumatic neurosis) which in fact constitutes a physical
injury.
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THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PATHFINDER AND THE
RATIONALE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
In Pathfinder, a case of first impression in Illinois, the claimant had
just turned away from a co-worker whom she had instructed on the operation
of a punch press when she heard cries for help. Upon turning back, she saw
that her co-worker's hand had been accidentally caught in the press and had
been severed at the wrist. After the claimant extracted the severed hand from
the press, she fainted. The claimant was taken to a hospital and was
discharged the next day with a final diagnosis of "anxiety reaction." "1 Two
weeks after the accident she returned to work but complained during this
time of a fear of the machines, nervousness, constant headaches, and
numbness in her extremities. As a consequence of these psychological
developments, the claimant found that she was unable to work and she filed
a claim for disability benefits under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act. 12 The Industrial Commission awarded her compensation for temporary
total disability but the award was subsequently reversed by the Circuit Court
of Cook County. From this judgment the claimant appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court.
The major issue which the court faced on appeal was "whether an
employee who suffers a sudden, severe emotional shock, traceable to a
definite time and place and to a readily perceivable cause, which produces
psychological disability, can recover under the Workmen's Compensation
Act . . . though the employee suffered no physical injury." 1 3 In answering
this question in the affirmative, the court propounded several reasons for
rejecting the physical impact requirement. Noting with approval the policy
that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed to
accomplish its purposes and objectives,14 and that the court had consistently
II. The "anxiety reaction" suffered by the claimant in Pathfinder is one example of a
"traumatic neurosis," a term used to describe a general psychological disturbance which, in
nearly all of the workmen's compensation cases involving mental injury caused by a mental
stimulus, is the debilitating nervous injury which forms the basis of the compensation claim. A
neurosis can best be defined, in laymen's terminology, as a "form of maladjustment in which a
patient, despite the fact that he is oriented to the external world, uses complaints or symptoms of
a physical nature to express psychological needs which arise from conflicts that are hidden
from the conscious aspect of the mind." Comment, Traumatic Neurosis and Suicide in Work-
men's Compensation Cases, I I DEPAUL L. REV. 257, 258 (1962). A neurosis is deemed to be
"traumatic" when it follows an injury (trauma) to the individual of either a physical or mental
nature. Besides anxiety reaction, a traumatic neurosis can take the form of conversion reaction,
obsessive reaction, or neurasthenia. For a comprehensive discussion of traumatic neuroses and
their legal implications see Schwartz, Neuroses Following Trauma, I TRAUMA 31 (1959); 3
LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 191 (1970); Comment, Traumatic Neurosis and Suicide in
Workmen's Compensation Cases, II DEPAUL L. REV. 257 (1962); Comment, Workmen's
Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129 (1%1).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138-138.28 (1975).
13. 62 11. 2d at 562, 343 N.E.2d at 916.
14. Id. at 563, 343 N.E.2d at 917. Accord, Board of Educ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 Ill. 2d
167, 171, 290 N.E.2d 247, 249 (1972):
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allowed recovery for psychological injury in previous cases where there had
been minor physical impact,' 5 the court came to the conclusion that there
was little to support the physical impact rule. The court noted that the rule's
inherent inconsistency
allows an award for a claimant under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act who is suffering from psychological disabilities caused by
an often minor physical injury, but denies an award to a claimant
with a similar psychological disability brought about, as here, by a
sudden, severe emotional shock and who fortuitously did not
sustain any physical injury in his accident.' 6
The liberal interpretation of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act
and the court's cognizance of the irrationality of the physical impact rule are
clearly significant factors which led to the court's rejection of that rule in
Pathfinder. However, had it not been for the particular language in the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, 17 it is doubtful that the court would
have gone so far in its analysis of the physical impact rule. The statutory
definition of compensable injury provided in any given workmen's compen-
sation statute determines to a large degree whether a claimant who has
suffered a mental injury as a result of a mental stimulus will be successful in
securing disability benefits." The existence of restrictive statutory defini-
tions of compensable injury, in addition to the reluctance of some courts to
differentiate workmen's compensation from the entirely distinct field of
negligence, has proved to be the main barrier to the elimination of the
physical impact rule in all jurisdictions. This barrier, and Pathfinder's
probable effect upon it, will be examined next.
THE PHYSICAL IMPACT RULE AS A MISPLACED TORT CONCEPT
The workmen's compensation cases that have involved some aspect of
mental or nervous injury may be divided into three distinct categories.1 9 The
The underlying purpose of workmen's compensation legislation in this and other
States is to provide financial protection in various forms, including the restoration of
lost wages, for workers whose earning power is interrupted or terminated as a
consequence of injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment.
15. 62 I11. 2d at 563-64, 343 N.E.2d at 917. See, e.g., Spetyla v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 111.
2d 1, 319 N.E.2d 40 (1974) (claimant fell and struck head on steel table); Hook v. Industrial
Comm'n, 53 I11. 2d 245, 290 N.E.2d 890 (1972) (claimant fell eight feet off of a scaffold and
struck his back on a box and some plywood); International Harvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 46
Ill. 2d 238, 263 N.E.2d 49 (1970) (claimant struck in head with tractor part); Olin Indus. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 394 Ill. 202, 68 N.E.2d 259 (1946) (metal guard on machine fell and struck
plaintiff on breast); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 345 Ill. 349, 178 N.E. 187
(1931) (claimant struck in head by superior).
16. 62 Ill. 2d at 564-65, 343 N.E.2d at 917.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138 (1975) provides that the purpose of the Act is to provide
compensation for "accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment."
18. "The right of an injured employee to receive compensation is defined in and measured
by the statute which creates the right." Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 696, 75 N.E.2d 511, 512
(1947).
19. IA A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.20 (1973).
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first category encompasses those cases in which recovery is sought for a
physical injury caused by a mental stimulus. This category includes situa-
tions in which a sudden, unexpected occurrence, 20 as well as a prolonged
stressful situation, 21 precipitates some type of physical harm. In cases that
fall within this first category, compensation has generally been awarded
under the applicable workmen's compensation statute. 22 Similarly, claim-
ants have generally been successful in obtaining disability benefits in those
cases that fall within the second category. This category includes cases in
which a mental or nervous injury (usually a traumatic neurosis) follows
either a physical injury to the claimant or at least some physical impact upon
his person. 23 The uniformity of opinion regarding recovery present in the
first two categories, however, is noticeably absent in the final category
which encompasses cases involving mental injury caused by a mental
stimulus. Even though most courts today would adhere to the reasoning of
Pathfinder and allow recovery under the applicable workmen's compensa-
tion statute for mental injury caused by a mental stimulus, 24 some courts still
have a disinclination to award compensation to claimants who incur injuries
of this type during the course of their employment. 25
The reason courts have historically been loath to award compensation
in mental stimulus-mental injury cases may be gleaned from an examination
of these three categories. In the first two categories, where benefits have
usually been awarded, there is the obvious presence of "something phys-
ical." This "something physical" takes the form of either a physical injury
to the claimant or a physical impact upon his person which has led to a
debilitating mental condition. The category encompassing the mental
stimulus-mental injury cases, however, involves neither physical injury nor,
more importantly for the purposes of this analysis, physical impact upon the
claimant's person. Thus, the awarding of compensation apparently hinges
upon the presence of "something physical." This demand for "something
physical" has consequently led courts to deny recovery for valid claims for
disability benefits based on mental injury under workmen's compensation
laws.
In the absence of a statute that explicitly requires physical impact, the
20. See, e.g., Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 380, 232 P.2d 975 (1951); In re Weiner's
Case, 345 Mass. 761, 186 N.E.2d 603 (1962); Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511
(1947); Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922); Geltman v. Reliable
Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 25 A.2d 894 (1942).
21. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 241 P.2d 299
(Cal. Ct. App.), aff'd in part, 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952); Klimas v. Trans Caribbean
Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961).
22. Contra, Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953).
23. See cases cited at note 15 supra.
24. See cases cited at note 42 infra.
25. See note 8 supra.
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demand for its presence in workmen's compensation cases involving mental
injury is undoubtedly due to the misapplication of tort principles to work-
men's compensation law. Courts have traditionally held in the field of torts
that there could be no damages awarded for mental distress negligently
inflicted upon the plaintiff unless there had been actual physical manifesta-
tions of injury and physical impact upon his person. 26 The major rationale
behind the creation and implementation of the physical impact rule was that
the awarding of damages for mere negligent infliction of mental distress
without more would open the proverbial "Pandora's Box" and flood the
courts with litigation involving fraudulent claims. 27 The judicial consensus
was that the requirement of physical impact would decrease the possibility
of awarding damages for groundless claims because courts could be assured
that the mental injury suffered by the plaintiff was real and not feigned.
Physical impact is, then, a tort concept formulated specifically for use
in cases involving the negligent infliction of emotional distress in order to
determine the validity of mental injury claims. Yet courts dealing with
workmen's compensation cases readily embraced the physical impact rule.
The judicial reasoning behind this development is not difficult to com-
prehend. To many courts, the workmen's compensation cases involving
mental injury understandably appeared similar to negligence cases involving
injuries of the same nature. In both types of cases, recovery was sought for
mental injury and the danger of filing fraudulent claims existed whether the
alleged mental injury arose in a negligence or workmen's compensation
context. 28 Thus, there appeared to be little reason why the physical impact
rule should not be applied to workmen's compensation cases where recovery
was sought for mental injury as well as to those cases in the field of
negligence. 29 As a consequence, courts applied the tort rule of physical
26. See, e.g., Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Spade v. Lynn & Boston
R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Ewing v. Pittsburg R.R., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892).
Contra, Purcell v. St. Paul Cty. Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). See also PROSSER,
supra note 6, at § 54.
27. See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966). Other considerations
underlying the creation of the physical impact rule were the potential of unlimited and indefinite
liability for every type of mental disturbance, unforeseeability of the injury, and the imposition
of burdensome and disproportionate liability on the tortfeasor in relation to his culpability.
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 402, 520 P.2d 758, 761 (1974).
28. Of particular fear in workmen's compensation cases was (and remains) the awarding
of disability benefits to a "malingerer," i.e., one who feigns mental injury for the dual purpose
of avoiding work and obtaining compensation. The Illinois Supreme Court felt, however, that
its recognition of recovery for mental injury resulting from a mental stimulus in Pathfinder
would not lead to an increase in the number of cases involving claims filed by malingering
employees. 62 II1. 2d at 567, 343 N.E.2d at 919.
29. In his article on workmen's compensation, Alexander Manson notes a more subtle
explanation for the implementation of the physical impact rule in that field:
The impact of old methods of analysis is hard to avoid in any area of intellectual
endeavor. It was almost inevitable that certain ways of thinking about a tort case of
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impact to compensation cases involving mental injury. In the process they
disregarded the fact that the procedures 30 and criteria 31 utilized in granting a
workmen's compensation award are vastly different from the processes
implemented in negligence cases for determining liability and damages.
The earlier workmen's compensation cases reveal the judicial depend-
ence upon tort principles and the accompanying application of the physical
impact rule (in the absence of a statutory requirement) in cases involving
some type of mental injury. In the 1932 case of Schuster v. Perryman
Electric Co. ,32 a cashier was frightened when the office where she worked
was held up by "bandits." The claimant's mental distress was objectively
manifested by her loss of voice. Although the New Jersey court had the
advantage of applying a workmen's compensation statute that allowed
compensation for "personal injury" caused by an "accident arising out of
and in the course of employment," 33 the court depended primarily upon tort
law 34 and refused to grant compensation because there was an absence of
physical impact upon the claimant. 35 What is notable about Schuster is that
while the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act allowed recovery for
injury by "accident arising out of and in the course of employment," it
allowed it only in situations where the "actual or lawfully imputed negli-
gence of the employer is the natural and proximate cause of the injury." 36
While the New Jersey statute is an anomaly in this regard,37 its provisions
clearly provided the Schuster court with a basis upon which it could easily
have dismissed the claimant's action. The claimant's injury was not oc-
casioned by any negligence on the part of the employer but rather by the
criminal acts of third persons. However, the court never considered this
more obvious approach and instead relied upon the physical impact doctrine
in an apparent attempt to declare the applicability of that rule to workmen's
compensation cases.
negligence would creep into the new scheme of workmen's compensation due to a
general tendency of the mind to relate the familiar to the new. The early cases under
workmen's compensation exhibited the tendency when they required that an injury
could not be compensated unless it resulted from a physical impact to the body.
Manson, Workmen's Compensation and the Disabling Neurosis, II BUFF. L. REV. 376, 377
(1962).
30. "The initial award is granted by an administrative board which is not bound by the
rules of evidence or procedural limitations on the courts." Id. at 376 n.8.
31. See note 6 supra.
32. 11 N.J. Misc. 16, 163 A. 437 (1932).
33. 1911 N.J. Laws ch. 95, § I (Supp. 1924) (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1
(West 1959)).
34. The two cases cited by the court in support of its holding, Ward v. West Jersey &
Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900), and Oehler v. L. Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J.
Misc. 1003, 135 A. 71 (1926), were both negligence cases.
35. Accord, Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 14 N.J. Misc. 791, 187 A. 334 (1936).
36. 1911 N.J. Laws ch. 95, § I (Supp. 1924) (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1
(West 1959)).
37. See note 6 supra.
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The physical impact rule was not to remain the sacrosanct legal princi-
ple that the court in Schuster believed it to be. Gradually support of the rule
was eroded in tort cases involving the negligent infliction of mental distress
when manifested by a physical illness or bodily harm, 38 particularly in those
cases in which the defendant's negligent act was directed toward the injured
plaintiff himself.39 Consequently, plaintiffs who had previously been denied
recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress because there had been no
physical impact could now recover damages.
This rejection of the physical impact rule was not universal, however.
Illinois was not affected by this trend in negligence law. Courts in Illinois
still depend upon the 1898 case of Braun v. Craven 40 and refuse to
recognize the compensability of mental injury in the absence of physical
impact. 41 But what is of greater importance analytically is the fact that once
again developments in workmen's compensation law in the area of mental
injury mirrored developments in common law negligence. In those states
that abandoned the necessity of physical impact in negligence, the physical
impact barrier fell in workmen's compensation cases involving mental
injury.42 Likewise, the Illinois courts' adherence to the physical impact rule
38. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Falzone v. Busch, 45
N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729,219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961).
There were two main reasons for this development. The first was that psychiatric tech-
niques had advanced to the point where it could be determined with a reasonable amount of
certainty whether or not the mental distress incurred by the defendant's negligent act was in
fact real. Thus, the fear of fraudulent claims was somewhat diminished. Secondly, courts
realized the inherent fallacy of the physical impact rule. The mental distress suffered by a
plaintiff, who, while crossing the street, has his pants' leg brushed by an automobile traveling at
ninety miles per hour is no greater than that sustained by a plaintiff who is missed by an inch.
The practice of awarding damages in the former case because there was physical impact and
denying recovery in the latter because there was not dealt a great injustice to injured-party
plaintiffs which did not go unnoticed by courts or commentators. These policy arguments are
discussed at length in Niedeerman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 40, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
39. See cases cited at note 38 supra. Recovery by bystander-plaintiffs who suffered
mental distress as a result of witnessing defendant's negligent infliction of harm upon a third
person was a later development. See text accompanying notes 78-91 infra.
40. 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
41. See text accompanying notes 93-95 infra.
42. E.g., Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 279 (1971); Rainko v. Webster-Eisenlohr, Inc., 306 Mich. 328, 10 N.W.2d 903 (1943);
Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941). Compare Wolfe v. Sibley,
Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975) with Chernin v.
Progress Serv. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 880, 216
N.Y.S.2d 697, 175 N.E.2d 827 (1961) and Straws v. Fail, 17 App. Div. 2d 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1962). Cf. Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeals Bd., 53 Haw. 32,
487 P.2d 278 (1971) (emotional stress as "accident"); Carter v. General Motors Corp., Chev-
rolet Gear & Axle Div., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960); Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d
411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Erhart v. Great Western Sugar Co., -Mont.-, 546 P.2d 1055 (1976);
Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446 (1953); Kinney v. State Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 245 Or. 543, 423 P.2d 186 (1967) (dictum); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co.,
154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955). Compare Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976) with School Dist. No. I v.
Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).
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in negligence was (until Pathfinder) reflected in a similar adherence to the
rule in workmen's compensation.
43
THE PHYSICAL IMPACT RULE AS A STATUTORY PREREQUISITE
To a large extent, the demise of the physical impact rule in workmen's
compensation is due either to the acceptance by the courts dealing with
mental stimulus-mental injury cases of the rationale used in negligence cases
to reject the rule" or to the long overdue recognition that any application of
tort doctrine to workmen's compensation is erroneous.45 However, the
reasons underlying the judicial abdication of the physical impact rule in
workmen's compensation cases are only partially uncovered by an examina-
tion of the rule as a misapplied tort concept. Other factors have played a part
in the rule's downfall and must necessarily be examined before the courts'
rejection of physical impact can be fully understood. One of these key
factors is the particular definition of compensable injury found in any given
compensation statute.
In nearly all of the compensation cases recognizing recovery in mental
stimulus-mental injury situations, the statutory definition of compensable
injury was broad enough to allow recovery. It was relatively easy for a court
to find that mental injury precipitated by a mental stimulus could be
compensable under a statute that awarded disability benefits for "accidental
injuries arising out of and in the scope of employment,",4 6 "injury by
accident, ' 47 or "any injury arising out of employment ' 48 once the policy
underpinnings of the physical impact requirement were found to be un-
sound. However, not every compensation statute is so broadly constructed.
The presence of a workmen's compensation statute requiring that benefits be
awarded only when there is evidence of "violence to the physical structure
of the body" 49 has usually been sufficient to dissuade courts from complete-
ly foregoing the necessity of "something physical."
43. See cases cited at note 15 supra.
44. See note 38 supra.
45. This was the rationale used in Pathfinder to reject any application of tort principles to
workmen's compensation cases. 62 Ill. 2d at 562, 343 N.E.2d at 916.
46. E.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902 (1)
(1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138 (1975); N. Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1965);
1912 MIcH. PUB. ACTS No. i0, Pt. II, § I (current version at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301 (1970)
("personal injury")).
47. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1041(a) (1971); GA. CODE § 114-102 (1975); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 386-3 (1968); Va. Code § 65.1-7 (1973); Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2)(D) (1973).
48. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West 1971) (amended 1976).
49. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1021(7) (West 1964) (amended 1976); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 287.020(3) (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(4) (1974); Law of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736 Art III,
§ 301(c) (current version at 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411 (1) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon 1967) (amended 1976).
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States that have the "violence to the physical structure of the body"
definition of compensable injury in their compensation statutes have been
the least amenable to the trend of awarding disability benefits in mental
stimulus-mental injury cases, as the cases of Bekeleski v. O.F. Neal Co. 50
and City Ice & Fuel Division v. Smith5' clearly attest. In Bekeleski, the
claimant was employed as an elevator operator by the defendant company.
While he was operating the elevator, a passenger was fatally injured when
he was caught between the elevator and one of the floors of the building.
The claimant had the unfortunate experience to be in the elevator for thirty
minutes with this dying man. He afterwards claimed that the incident had
such a deleterious effect upon his nervous system that he was unable to work
and was thus entitled to compensation under the Nebraska Workmen's
Compensation Act. 5
2
The situation presented in Bekeleski is not unlike that presented in
Pathfinder. In both cases the witnessing of the infliction of a serious injury
upon a third person resulted in mental injury to the claimant. However, the
court in Bekeleski did not have the opportunity to apply to the case the fairly
broad definition of compensable injury found in the Illinois act. 53 It was,
instead, constrained by the "violence to the physical structure of the body"
language of the Nebraska statute. In applying that statute to the case, the
court said:
It seems to us that the legislature required . .. that the
accident must be accompanied by violence to the physical struc-
ture of the body. The language indicates a clear distinction be-
tween physical and bodily injury on the one hand and mental,
nervous, and psychiatric injury unaccompanied by violence to the
physical structure of the body on the other. The plain import of
the words used eliminates from the operation of the law dis-
abilities resulting from mental disturbances, nervousness and psy-
chiatric ailments when violence to the physical structure of the
body cannot be established.54
While the court in Bekeleski denied the claimant disability benefits by
engaging in an examination of legislative intent to discern how strictly the
compensation statute was to be construed, the court in City Ice applied a
statute whose restrictive provisions obviated any necessity of ascertaining
the intent of the legislature. In City Ice, the claimant sustained mental injury
("conversion hysteria") after he had been involved in a traffic accident
while driving his employer's truck. The claimant suffered no physical
injury. The Florida Workmen's Compensation Act provided that " 'Acci-
50. 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
51. 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952).
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-152 (1929) (amended 1974).
53. See note 17 supra.
54. 141 Neb. at 660, 4 N.W.2d at 743.
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dent' shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly.
A mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only . . . shall be
deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of employment . . 55
Not surprisingly, the court refused to recognize the claim.
The existence of a statutory definition of compensable injury requiring
that there be "violence to the physical structure of the body" has postponed
the total elimination of the physical impact rule and has provided a formid-
able barrier to recovery for mental injury caused by a mental stimulus in
states that have compensation statutes of this kind. However, not all juris-
dictions with this type of statute have found it to be so confining. A few
courts have managed to circumvent the statute and alleviate its harsh effect
by placing primary emphasis not on the cause of the injury but its effect.
This approach is best seen in Bailey v. American General Insurance Co. 
56
In Bailey, the claimant and a co-worker were working on a scaffold
eight stories above the ground when one end of the scaffold gave way and
the claimant's companion fell to his death. While the claimant was not
physically injured, he contended that he was entitled to recover workmen's
compensation because the traumatic effect of the accident upon his person
directly resulted in a traumatic neurosis (anxiety reaction) that made it
impossible for him to return to work. Even though the Texas Workmen's
Compensation Act 7 defined compensable injury as being "damage or harm
to the physical structure of the body," the court held that disability benefits
could be awarded. Interpreting the term "physical structure" to mean the
entire body and not just the skeletal, digestive, or circulatory systems,58 the
court concluded that the claimant's "physical structure"-his body as a
whole-no longer functioned properly as a result of this psychoneurotic
disturbance. 59 Consequently, the claimant's injury was one for which recov-
ery could be obtained under the Texas act.
What is of interest in Bailey is that the court awarded compensation by
examining the effect of the claimant's injury and not the cause. Considering
the statutory language and the approach taken in other jurisdictions with
similarly phrased statutes,6° it is noteworthy that the court refrained from
entertaining the question of whether the fact that the injury was caused
solely by a mental stimulus would preclude recovery. A close reading of
55. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1949) (amended 1974).
56. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
57. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon 1967) (amended 1976).
58. 154 Tex. at 436, 279 S.W.2d at 319.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., City Ice & Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952); Hackett v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 758 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Bekeleski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb.
657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942); Liscio v. Makransky & Sons, 147 Pa. Super. Ct. 483, 24 A.2d 136
(1942).
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Bailey would thus seem to indicate that the absence of physical impact is not
to be considered a bar to recovery. The key issue in cases where recovery is
sought for mental injury resulting from a mental stimulus under statutes
requiring "violence," "damage," or "harm" to the physical structure of
the body under a Bailey analysis is no longer what constitutes "violence,"
"damage," or "harm" but rather how "physical structure" is to be de-
fined. Consequently, some courts which have awarded compensation in
mental stimulus-mental injury cases under this restrictive type of statute
have utilized the Bailey approach, emphasized the effect of the injury, and
minimized the issue of whether mental stimulus alone is a sufficient causal
factor. 6 1
Bailey, however, suffers from the inherent weakness that the court's
refusal to deal with the physical impact rule is never explained. If the court
had explicitly stated that physical impact was not worthy of discussion
because of its irrelevancy, there is little question that the physical impact
rule would have been dealt a serious blow in those states that have compen-
sation statutes with restrictive definitions of compensable injury. The
court's silence, however, allows for speculation into its rationale. From this
speculation two possibilities have emerged: either the court in fact was of
the opinion that physical impact was of no concern or it realized that the
only way to avoid the physical impact requirement that appears on the face
of the statute was to ignore it completely. In light of the experiences that
courts in other jurisdictions have had with statutes of a similar type,62 the
second alternative cannot be easily dismissed as a possible explanation for
the court's reticence to discuss the physical impact issue. If in fact the
Bailey decision is the result of a conscious endeavor to sidestep apparent
statutory requirements, its effectiveness as authority for the proposition that
compensation can be awarded without evidence of physical impact in
jurisdictions with statutes that apparently make impact a prima facie element
of a compensation claim is greatly diminished. Indeed, if this is the case,
Bailey and its progeny would seem to indicate that restrictive statutory
language found in many compensation statutes remains the main barrier to
the total elimination of the physical impact rule.
The foregoing analysis of the physical impact rule and its effect upon
workmen's compensation cases involving mental injury has attempted to
show that while the obvious dependence by courts upon the physical impact
61. See, e.g., Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Kinney v. State
Indus. Accident Comm'n, 245 Or. 543, 423 P.2d 186 (1967) (dictum); cf. Carter v. General
Motors Corp., Chevrolet Gear & Axle Div., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960) (emotional
stress as "accident"); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446
(emotional stress as "accident").
62. See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
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rule has diminished in recent years, the rule still exists in jurisdictions that
have the "violence to the physical structure of the body" definition of
compensable injury in their compensation statutes. While Pathfinder is
certainly indicative of the current trend in workmen's compensation cases
concerning a mental stimulus-mental injury, its effect upon those juris-
dictions with restrictive statutory definitions of compensable injury is less-
ened as a result of its factual setting. In recognizing recovery in the mental
stimulus-mental injury situation, the Supreme Court of Illinois had the
opportunity to apply to the facts of the case a compensation statute that
included a fairly broad definition of compensable injury.63 In reality all the
court had to do to allow recovery in Pathfinder was reject the applicability
of tort principles to workmen's compensation. This procedure, however, is
relatively ineffective when the statute itself demands that there be "violence
to the physical structure of the body." It thus appears that Bailey, its
weaknesses notwithstanding, is more persuasive authority 64 than Pathfinder
for a court that deems it necessary to circumvent restrictive statutory lan-
guage and allow recovery in a mental stimulus-mental injury case. The court
in Bailey (unlike the court in Pathfinder) had to contend with a statute that
on its face was not conducive to allowing recovery without the presence of
"something physical."
This is not to say that Pathfinder is devoid of any persuasive effect
whatsoever in jurisdictions that continue to adhere to the physical impact
rule because of the presence of a restrictive statute. Pathfinder is important
insofar as it is one more case in which the physical impact rule has fallen and
it indicates clearly the overall erosion of the requirement of physical impact
in workmen's compensation cases involving mental injury. However, the
existence of a broadly worded definition of compensable injury precludes
Pathfinder from being regarded as highly persuasive in jurisdictions whose
workmen's compensation statutes include restrictive definitions of com-
pensable injury.
63. See note 17 supra.
64. It would indeed be difficult for a court that rejects the physical impact rule in
workmen's compensation cases to find appropriate precedential authority within its own state
supportive of such a holding. Obviously, no such authority exists. Consequently it is not
uncommon to find courts dealing with mental injury-mental stimulus cases citing authority from
other jurisdictions which they consider to be persuasive. The Illinois Supreme Court went
through such a procedure in Pathfinder. Since Pathfinder was a case of first impression in the
state, the court found no Illinois case law upon which to base its decision. As a result, the court
looked to case law from other jurisdictions for support. After noting that the majority of
jurisdictions no longer require physical impact, the court cited cases giving support to both
sides of the issue. While the court did not consider the holdings in favor of the rule's elimination
to be in any way binding upon it, it did find them to be "preferred." 62 Iil. 2d at 565-66, 343
N.E.2d at 918.
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EMOTIONAL STRESS AS "ACCIDENT"
Most of the workmen's compensation cases discussed thus far have
involved mental stimulus in the form of a sudden, violent happening. There
arise situations, however, in which the mental injury sustained by the
claimant is incurred not as a result of an unexpected, violent occurrence but
rather as the result of a gradual buildup of emotional stress. Since no
analysis of the law of workmen's compensation concerning recovery for
mental injury resulting from a mental stimulus would be complete without
an examination of the situations in which the injury-causing "accident" is
emotional stress, the problems surrounding this particular factual situation,
their judicial resolution, and the effect of Pathfinder upon future litigation in
this area will next be discussed.
Courts dealing with the emotional stress as mental stimulus situation in
workmen's compensation cases encounter a two-fold problem in determin-
ing whether mental injury allegedly caused in this manner is compensable.
First, the court must determine if the accumulation of mental and emotional
strain constitutes an "accident" within the meaning of the applicable com-
pensation statute. Second, if the statutory definition of "accident" is met,
the court must determine if there was sufficient causation, i.e., whether the
mental injury did in fact arise out of the employment situation. 65 An
overview of the cases involving emotional stress as "accident" reveals that
there is clear majority opinion as to the compensability of mental injury so
sustained. The cases of Shope v. Industrial Commission66 and Ferguson v.
HDE, Inc. 67 show the wide disparity in judicial opinions concerning this
issue. In Shope, the claimant applied for compensation under the Arizona
Workmen's Compensation Act68 contending that emotional stress at work
had led to a disabling anxiety neurosis. While the statute itself allowed
compensation for "injury by accident," 69 the court interpreted "accident"
to be "any unexpected injury-causing event." 70 It held that the injury was
noncompensable because the disability resulted not from an unexpected
event but rather from a gradual buildup of emotional stress over a period of
years before the injury. 71
65. Cf. Note, Emotional Stress-Now a Cause of Compensable Injury?, 34 LA. L. REV.
846, 847-48 (1974) (two basic questions in emotional stress as "accident" cases are causation in
fact and the sufficiency of that causation to warrant a legal remedy).
66. 17 Ariz. App. 23, 495 P.2d 148 (1972).
67. 264 La. 204, 270 So. 2d 867 (1972), aff'd in part on remand, 274 So. 2d 783 (La. App.
1973).
68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-901 to 1091 (1971).
69. Id. § 23-1041(a).
70. The term "accident" was defined in Brock v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Ariz. App. 95,
96, 486 P.2d 207, 208 (1971).
71. Accord, Ayer v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 Ariz. App. 163, 531 P.2d 208 (1975); cf.
Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196 Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966) (mental breakdown
does not constitute "injury by accident").
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However, not even a statutory definition of "accident" as an "unex-
pected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently" 72 prevented
the Louisiana Supreme Court from holding that emotional stress was in-
cluded within such a definition in Ferguson.73 In that case an employee
suffered a cerebral hemorrhage as a result of a dispute with his employer
concerning his paycheck. Although there was precedent74 supporting the
proposition that such an injury could not be compensable because of the
language of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, the court over-
ruled these prior cases insofar as they held that there could be no "accident"
(and hence no compensable injury) when the disability results from "extra-
ordinary mental or emotional causes."75 While Ferguson involved physical
injury, the court's opinion that mental stimulus in the form of emotional
stress could constitute an "accident" under workmen's compensation stat-
utes was echoed in other jurisdictions in cases involving mental injury. 76
Any possible effect of Pathfinder upon a future determination of
whether emotional stress may constitute an "accident" in any given work-
men's compensation case is lessened by the fact that the holding of Path-
finder is narrowly limited to the factual situation presented in that case. It is
clear from the way in which the court framed the issue in Pathfinder-
"whether an employee who suffers a sudden, severe emotional shock,
traceable to a definite time and place and to a readily perceivable cause,
which produces psychological disability, can recover under the Workmen's
Compensation Act . . . though the employee suffered no physical in-
jury' 77-that the court was concerned only with a sudden, violent mental
stimulus as a cause of mental injury and not with the gradual buildup of
emotional stress. Because the issue was so narrowly drawn and the holding
so narrowly confined, it appears that Pathfinder can have but a limited
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1021(1) (West 1964) (amended 1976).
73. 264 La. 204, 270 So. 2d 867 (1972), aff'd in part on remand, 274 So. 2d 783 (La. App.
1973).
74. E.g. Danziger v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 245 La. 33, 156 So. 2d 468 (1963);
Johnson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 196 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1967).
75. 270 So. 2d at 870. For a discussion of Ferguson and the development of emotional
stress as "accident" see Note, Emotional Stress-Now a Cause of Compensable Injury?, 34
LA. L. REV. 846 (1974).
76. See, e.g., Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw.
32, 487 P.2d 278 (1971); Carter v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Gear & Axle Div., 361
Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960); Erhart v. Great Western Sugar Co.,-Mont.-, 546 P.2d
1055 (1976) (compensation awarded claimant who suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of
work pressures under MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 92-418(1) (Supp. 1975) (amending MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 92-418(1) (1947) which defined compensable injury as a "tangible happen-
ing of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain"). Compare Swiss
Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d
128 (1976) with School Dist. No. I v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.
2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).
77. 62 Il1. 2d at 562, 343 N.E.2d at 916.
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effect, in Illinois or elsewhere, upon any future determination of the "emo-
tional stress as causal factor" issue.
THE TREND IN NEGLIGENCE AND PATHFINDER 'S EFFECT
Insofar as the law of torts has in the past had a significant influence
upon the field of workmen's compensation, as evidenced by the parallel
developments of the physical impact rule in torts and workmen's compensa-
tion, it is appropriate to examine whether the latter holds true, i.e., whether
developments in workmen's compensation have any effect at all upon the
law of torts, particularly negligence law. To this end this comment will now
examine whether Pathfinder will have any repercussions in this distinct yet
traditionally related field.
The closest analogy to the fact pattern of Pathfinder to be found in the
field of negligence is seen in those cases in which the plaintiff attempts to
recover damages for mental injury occasioned by the witnessing of the
negligent infliction of harm by the defendant upon a third person. The
question of whether a plaintiff who has sustained mental injury in this
manner may recover damages is one that is unresolved and open to a great
deal of controversy in the law of torts. 78 The traditional view has been that a
plaintiff who has suffered a mental disturbance manifested by physical
injury as a result of witnessing the negligent infliction of harm upon another
could not be awarded damages unless there had been some physical impact
upon his person. 79 With the diminution of the physical impact rule, howev-
er, courts began to take a more liberal approach. Damages were awarded to
bystander-plaintiffs in a number of jurisdictions if the plaintiff could show
that at the time of the defendant's negligent act he feared for his own safety 80
or was within a "zone of danger." 8 1
The Supreme Court of California took a giant step toward abandoning
the use of fictions in negligence cases involving bystander-plaintiffs in the
seminal decision of Dillon v. Legg.8 In Dillon, the mother and sister of a
deceased infant sought damages for emotional shock and physical injury
78. See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, at § 54; Annot., 29 A.L.R. 3d 1337 (1970);
Strothman, Traumatic Neurosis-A Medical-Legal Approach, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 350, 372-77
(1967); 73 DICK. L. REV. 350 (1969); 18 S.D. L. REV. 251 (1973); Comment, Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress: The Case For An Independent Tort, 59 GEo. L.J. 1237 (1971); 1 U.C.L.A.-
ALAS. L. REV. 64 (1971).
79. E.g., Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959);
Smith v. Gowdy, 196 Ky. 281, 244 S.W. 678 (1922); Holland v. Good Bros., 318 Mass. 300, 61
N.E.2d 544 (1945).
80. E.g., Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md.
479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963).
81. See Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965) (plaintiff's complaint
dismissed because there was no allegation that plaintiff was "personally subjected to the hazard
of physical harm").
82. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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suffered by them when they witnessed the defendant-motorist strike the
infant with his automobile. The lower court dismissed the mother's com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action, insofar as the emotional distress
did not arise out of a "fear for her own safety," 83 but sustained the sister's
complaint because at the time of the accident she was within the "zone of
danger." On appeal, the supreme court condemned the artificiality of the
"zone of danger" rule. 84 In its place the court formulated a foreseeability
test in which the mental injury caused to the bystander-plaintiff could be the
subject of damages so long as the injury was or should have been reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant.8 5 Other factors which the court held to be
worth considering in the eventual determination of liability were the near-
ness of the plaintiff to the scene of the accident, whether the injury resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident as opposed to learning of the
accident from another after its occurrence, and the relationship between the
victim and the plaintiff.86
The impact of Dillon was widespread and its progeny went even
further in applying the foreseeability test and allowing bystander-plaintiffs
to recover damages for their mental injury. In Leong v. Takasaki,87 the
court allowed a ten-year-old boy who had witnessed the defendant-motorist
strike his stepgrandmother with his automobile to recover damages for the
mental injury he sustained. The court expanded the Dillon holding by
stating that the mental injury need not be manifested by physical injury for it
to be the subject of damages.88 The court also stated that the absence of a
blood relationship between the victim and plaintiff would not preclude
83. The court depended upon Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957), in
applying this test.
84. 68 Cal. 2d at 732-33, 441 P.2d at 915-16, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
85. Accord, D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I.), modified on other
grounds, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973) (applying Rhode Island law);
D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973); D'Ambra v.
United States,-R.I.-, 338 A.2d 524 (1975) (certified question from Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit). Contra, Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973)
(applying Nebraska law); White v. Diamond, 390 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1974) (applying
Maryland law); Howard v. Bloodworth, 137 Ga. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122 (1976); Hickman v.
Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 314 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471,
238 A.2d 728 (1968); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
86. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
87. 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
88. Cf. Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967)
(allegation of shock to nervous system stated physical injury); Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis.
2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970) (dictum). Contra, Krouse v. Graham, 57 Cal. App. 3d 752, 129
Cal. Rptr. 624 (1976); Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639
(1975).
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recovery. 89 In Archibald v. Braverman, 90 the court awarded damages for
mental injury even though the plaintiff did not personally witness the
accident. This, however, is strictly a minority position, and most courts
refuse to extend Dillon this far.
91
It is doubtful that Pathfinder, standing alone, could have much effect
upon the overall development of negligence law in this area. While courts
dealing with workmen's compensation cases in the past have had a propensi-
ty to rely upon tort law in determining the compensability of certain
employment-related injuries, 92 the opposite does not seem to hold true. It
appears that courts have not found principles promulgated in workmen's
compensation cases to be in any way determinative of the issues in common
law negligence cases having similar fact patterns. Given this tendency of
courts dealing with negligence law to refrain from analogizing workmen's
compensation cases, and the existence of a considerable amount of case law
on the subject, it seems unlikely that any court concerned with a negligence
case would find Pathfinder to be persuasive authority for the proposition
that a bystander-plaintiff may recover damages for mental injury manifested
by physical injury in the absence of physical impact. Courts involved with
negligence cases could, however, find Pathfinder to be of some limited use
as authority because it is an example of the general trend in the traditionally
related field of workmen's compensation to award disability benefits for
mental injury in the absence of physical impact.
While Pathfinder's effect upon negligence law may be minimal, its
possible prophetic character in the state of Illinois cannot be ignored. Ever
since 1898,93 Illinois courts have consistently maintained that damages
cannot be awarded for the negligent infliction of mental distress without
physical impact, despite the rejection of this view in a majority of juris-
dictions. 94 Although the Illinois Supreme Court made it clear in Pathfinder
that its decision to reject the physical impact rule was decided "indepen-
dently of [its] common law holdings in tort that deal with the question of
whether one may be liable for negligently causing mental distress or harm
where there was no physical trauma or impact with the victim," 95 the fact
89. The impact of this statement was lessened by the fact that the court found there to be
in Hawaii a tradition of strong ties among members of the same extended family group and that
these ties were just as strong as the ties of a close blood relationship. 55 Haw. at 410, 520 P.2d at
766. The ability of a bystander-plaintiff to recover for his mental injury still remains negligible if
the bystander is a stranger to the victim.
90. 79 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
91. See, e.g., Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974); Strickland
v. Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706 (1975); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56
Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975); Deem v. Town of Newmarket, 115 N.H. 56, 333 A.2d 446 (1975).
92. See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
93. The leading case in Illinois is Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
94. See PROSSER, supra note 6, at § 54.
95. 62 11. 2d at 562, 343 N.E.2d at 916.
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remains that the court in Pathfinder eliminated the physical impact rule in a
field of law that is in many ways analogous to negligence law. It is thus
possible that Pathfinder is an indication of the foreseeable abolition of
physical impact in Illinois negligence law.
CONCLUSION
While Pathfinder is certainly a landmark case in Illinois and will
undoubtedly have a substantial effect upon the shape of future litigation in
workmen's compensation cases in this state, its overall effect upon work-
men's compensation law outside of Illinois is likely to be minimal. Given
the existence of a compensation statute that defines compensable injury in
fairly broad terms, and the overall trend in the field of workmen's compen-
sation to award disability benefits in the mental stimulus-mental injury
situation without evidence of physical impact, the Illinois Supreme Court
would have been hard-pressed to find a valid reason for refusing to reject the
antiquated physical impact rule and rid Illinois workmen's compensation
law of this stifling vestige of a less enlightened time. Unfortunately, courts
in jurisdictions that have restrictive "violence to the physical structure of the
body" statutory definitions of compensable injury will not feel so similarly
compelled to accept Pathfinder as persuasive authority. Pathfinder, while
indicative of the general trend in workmen's compensation law, cannot be
regarded as being highly persuasive in a jurisdiction where it is not the
misapplication of tort principles through case law, but rather the words of
the statute itself, that demand physical impact upon the claimant as a
necessary condition to recovery for mental injury in workmen's compensa-
tion cases.
Nor will Pathfinder be persuasive in those cases in which the injury-
inducing mental stimulus takes the form of emotional stress. Pathfinder is
perhaps more important for what it did not say than for what it said and it did
not say that any mental stimulus would constitute a sufficient causal factor
in mental injury cases. Pathfinder was narrowly limited to holding only that
a sudden, severe emotional shock, traceable to a particular point in time,
was a sufficient causal factor. It never reached the issue of "emotional stress
as accident." The court left that issue to be determined at a future time. If
Pathfinder is any indication of the progressive direction in which the Illinois
Supreme Court is headed, however, the time should not be long in coming
when recovery may be obtained under the Illinois Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act for mental injury precipitated by any type of mental stimulus.
JOSEPH R. PODLEWSKI
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